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1. Introduction 
International  trade  flows  are  affected  by  factors  beyond  usual  ones  such  as  technology, 
institutions and policies. Indeed, Rauch (1996) suggested that, in the uncertain environment 
of international trade, migrant networks could promote trade by reducing search costs and 
enforcing  contracts.  Following  his  groundbreaking  analysis,  researchers  devoted  special 
attention to the role of migrant networks in overcoming trade barriers. While many studies 
found a positive correlation between migration and trade, it is still not clear what problems 
migrant networks help to solve. Identifying the  causality and the  mechanisms at work is 
therefore of crucial importance to better understand what holds trade back and how it can be 
set free.  
In this paper I combine insights from information-based models of trade (Rauch 1996, 1999), 
distorted gravity models (Chaney 2008) and models of trade and insecurity (Anderson and 
Marcouiller 2002) to examine carefully the  mechanisms through which  migrant networks 
grease the wheels of international commerce. I study the case of Switzerland, which provides 
high-quality,  unexploited  migration  data,  using  a  novel  instrumental  variable  method  to 
verify the direction of causality.  
I find a positive and significant causal effect of immigration on trade, implying that a 10% 
increase in immigration from a certain country can increase exports to that country by as 
much  as  4.5%.  I  find  that  the  effect  is  bigger  when  institutions  are  weak,  and  almost 
inexistent  when  institutions  are  strongest,  highlighting  the  ability  of  migrant  networks  to 
substitute for formal institutions. I find robust evidence of this substitution effect for different 
trade flows by examining how the significance and magnitude of the marginal effect vary 
across various institutional quality levels, such as control-of-corruption, rule-of-law or more 
specific  policy  indicators  from  the  Doing  Business  database.    Using  various  estimation 
methods, such  as  IV-2SLS, Poisson pseudo  maximum  likelihood and 3SLS  confirms the 
findings.  
Unlike  Rauch  and  Trindade  (2002),  who  showed  ethnic  Chinese  networks  facilitate 
international trade by helping to match buyers and sellers in characteristics space, I find no 
ordering  of  magnitudes  when  estimating  the  protrade  effect  of  migrants  across  product 
differentiation categories. However, decomposing trade flows into intensive and extensive 
margins,  I  find  that  the  protrade  effect  takes  place  entirely  on  the  extensive  margin, 
suggesting migrant networks do engender new trade relationships. One possible explanation 3 
 
could be that, rather than reducing search costs, migrant networks may be reducing fixed 
entry costs characterized by corruption.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature 
and describes the theoretical mechanisms. A third section presents the empirical strategy and 
data. The results are discussed in the fourth section. A last section concludes. 
2. How migrants affect trade – Literature review 
The  power  of  migrant  networks  to  compensate  for  the  lack  of  contract  enforcement  in 
international trade and to provide market information has been an area of empirical research 
since Greif (1993).  Studying the Maghribi traders of the 11
th  century,  he  illustrated the 
importance of networks in providing the framework required for the operation of the market 
by influencing the cost, if not the feasibility, of trade. For the past millennia, trade diasporas 
such as the Greeks in Malabar or the Genoese in Syria provided this structure (Bernstein 
2008).  In his survey of business and social networks in international trade, Rauch (2001) 
provides many more examples, from the Armenian community of the 17
th-18
th centuries to 
today’s Hausa in West Africa. 
With  this  framework  in  mind,  Rauch  and  Trindade  (2002)  looked  at  business  networks 
created  by  ethnic  Chinese  migrants  around  the  world.  By  showing  that  countries  with  a 
greater share of Chinese migrants trade more with each other, and that the effect is greater for 
differentiated products, they pointed up that ethnic Chinese networks facilitate international 
trade by helping to match buyers and sellers in characteristics space, as well as by deterring 
opportunistic behaviour through community sanctions.  
In this day and age it is not only the Chinese who create such migrant networks as most 
migrants  keep  ties  to  their  home  country.  Much  attention  has  been  devoted  to  migrant 
networks in the United States. Gould (1994), Herande and Saavedra (2005), Dunlevy (2006), 
Bandyopadhyay et. al. (2007) and White and Bedassa (2008) used US data to confirm the 
importance of migrant networks in increasing US exports. Head and Ries (1998) found some 
evidence  for Canada,  Koenig (2009)  for France, Peri and  Requena (2009)  for Spain and 
Felbermayr and Toubal (2008) for OECD countries.  Still, the mechanisms at play remain 
blurry. The literature has suggested three mechanisms through which migrants promote trade: 
(i) trust, (ii) information and, (iii) preferences. 
2.1 Trust 4 
 
International trade  is  no easy task, especially when  it  involves developing countries with 
unsound  institutions.  Routes  are  dangerous,  with  pirates,  professional  crooks,  imaginary 
tariffs and corrupt border agents scattered all over. Indeed, one reason why so little trade 
occurs  with  developing  countries  is  that  their  low  quality  of  governance  and  rapacious 
corrupt officials affect risk perceptions (Anderson 2000, Anderson and Marcouiller 2002, 
Dollar  and  Kray  2002).    And  if  there  is  a  high  degree  of  uncertainty  about  contract 
enforcement, a high level of trust is required for transactions to happen (Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales 2009). Thanks to cultural proximity, repeated transactions, or knowledge of implicit 
business rules, this necessary trust may exist within migrant networks. 
Differences in culture and ways of doing business render trade  all the more complicated. 
While  tariffs  and  other  formal  trade  barriers  affect  homogenously  all  potential  traders, 
corruption deters mostly those who don’t know the rules of the game (Crozet, Koenig and 
Rebeyrol 2008). Migrants may possess exclusive knowledge about the ways of dealing with 
border  and  government  officials  in  their  home  country  which  improves  their  capacity  to 
facilitate, or even create, trade. This knowledge of informal ways should therefore be most 
useful when formal institutions are on the blink, when contract enforcement is uncertain, or 
when  business  cultures  are  most  different. This  is  what  Dunlevy  (2006)  and  White  and 
Bedassa (2008) proposed by showing that corruption and cultural differences increased the 
protrade effect of immigrants.  
2.2 Information  
Missing  information  about  available  products  and  tastes  results  in  a  search  for  the  right 
differentiated  products  that  increases  trade  costs  and  reduces  trade  (Rauch  1996).  By 
providing specific knowledge about products’ supply and demand in origin and destination 
countries, migrant networks migrants can lower the informational frictions and render trade 
feasible. Rauch and Trindade (2002) suggested  that the protrade effect of  immigrants on 
homogenous  goods  could  be  used  to  measure  their  trust  effect  while  their  effect  on 
differentiated  products  also  includes  the  mechanism  of  market  information.  They  thus 
identified  the  information  channel  by  showing  that  the  network  effect  on  trade  was 
statistically bigger for differentiated goods. Felbermayr and Toubal (2008) confirmed this 
result using data from OECD countries but Felbermayr, Jung and Toubal (2009) applied an 
updated empirical  approach to the Rauch  and Trindade (2002) data and did  not find the 
intuitive  size  ranking  of  network  coefficients  across  differentiated  and  exchange  traded 
goods. Hence the theory remains unsettled. 5 
 
More  recently,  Peri  and  Requena  (2009)  pointed  out  that  immigrants  provide  market 
information that reduces the fixed costs of setting up business in their country of origin. But 
they define these set-up costs broadly, including search costs but also risk costs, such as those 
created by corruption.  Using data from Spain, they did find that immigrants significantly 
increase exports almost entirely via the extensive margin, as predicted by their impact on 
fixed entry costs.  
2.3 Import preferences 
Migrants may have a strong preference for products from their origin country. For example, 
Indian migrants may want to import spices from India. Rauch (2001) noted that the export 
elasticity reflects a network effect while the import elasticity also includes a demand effect. 
The effect of migrants on imports should therefore be stronger than on exports. Felbermayr 
and  Toubal  (2008)  identify  the  preference  effect  by  assuming  symmetric  trust  and 
information effects across exports and imports, while assuming a preference effect only for 
imports. They find that the preference effect of migration on bilateral trade amounts to up to 
63% of the total effect. 
The rest of this paper will look at these mechanisms more carefully, studying the case of 
Switzerland. 
3. Empirical method and data 
To estimate the protrade effect of migrants and disentangle the mechanisms at work, I use an 
enhanced log linear version of the gravity equation based on the Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003)  method  to  consistently  estimate  a  theoretical  gravity  equation  and  calculate  the 
comparative statics of trade frictions. I study the case of Switzerland as it provides untapped 
high quality immigration data available for seven years from 1996 to 2005 from the Swiss 
Federal Statistics Office. The model can be written as follows: 
ln TRADEit = f(ln MIGRANTSit,  ln GDPit, ln GDPPCit, ln DISTANCEit, CORRUPTIONit, 
ln MIGRANTSit* CORRUPTIONit, Zit), 
where 
ln TRADEit is the logarithm of the value of Swiss exports or imports (depending upon the 
regression) to country i in year t in current US dollars. The data is from the UN Comtrade 
database,  6 
 
MIGRANTSit is the stock of immigrants from country i in year t in Switzerland. Data is 
from the Swiss Federal Statistics Office. 
GDPit is country i’s Gross Domestic Product in current US dollars in year t, taken from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)  
GDPPCit is country i’s Gross Domestic Product per capita in current US dollars in year t, 
also taken from the WDI, 
DISTANCEi  is  the  distance  in  km  between  Zurich  and  country  i’s  principal  city,  as 
reported by CEPII, 
CORRUPTIONit is an indicator of country i’s corruption in year t from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators of the  World Bank and  it measures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Zit  includes  other  variables  that  characterise  the  relationship  between  country  i  and 
Switzerland, such as a common language dummy (German, French or Italian), a shared 
border dummy, a preferential trade agreement (PTA) dummy built using information found 
on bilaterals.org
2, as well as dummy variables for country i’s insularity, landlockness and a 
measure of remoteness from the rest of the world, defined as    𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1,𝑘≠𝑖  𝐷𝑖??𝑖𝑘  
−1
 as 
suggested by Head (2003). 
To examine the search mechanism I aggregate goods according to the Rauch (1999) liberal 
classification
3. Homogenous goods, such as coffee or rice, have their prices quoted on 
organized exchanges. “Reference priced” goods, such as hydrogenated animal oils or resin-
based  chemical products, have their prices quoted  in trade publications.  Other goods are 
classified  as  “differentiated”.  To  examine  how  corruption  affects  the  protrade  effect  of 
migrants, I interact the corruption indicator with the logarithm of the stock of migrants as in 
Dunlevy (2006). 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Before proceeding to the estimation I here provide some descriptive statistics. Switzerland 
trades mostly with rich and developed countries while immigration sources are mostly its 
neighbours and the ex-Yugoslavian countries (Figure 1). Only four countries are both top 10 
                                                 
2 These countries are Chile, Israel, Iceland, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, South 
Korea, Tunisia and Turkey. 
3 Using the conservative classification leads to the same results. 7 
 
trade partners and migrant suppliers, i.e. Germany, Italy, France and Spain. There seems to be 
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Table 1. Summary statistics (Averaged across years) 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Migrants  182  8010.2  31925.9  0  329462.3 
Control of corruption  178  -0.00  0.98  -1.65  2.39 
GDP  188  1.75E+11  8.17E+11  5.12E+07  9.69E+12 
GDP per capita  166  8578.9  9106.9  555.91  46427.4 
Distance  182  3706.327  2396.928  207.5064  11612.89 
Remoteness  197  .0477716  .0400126  .0007104  .1920954 
PTA  197  .0364559  .1654659  0  1 
Island  182  .1978022  .3994411  0  1 
Landlocked  182  .2032967  .4035616  0  1 
Border  182  .021978  .1470161  0  1 
Common language  182  .1868132  .3908367  0  1 
Swiss migrants  194  7225.33  25320.8  0  239185 
Migrants in France  195  31554.4  128252.9  0  1333587.0 
Visa restrictions  187  .6256684  .485249  0  1 
Passport costs  121  48.82826  43.95142  0  333.57 
  Differentiated  197  352040.8  1372601.0  0  1.47E+07 
Exports  Reference priced  197  86996.4  386457.8  0  4247782.0 
  Homogenous  197  21449.1  88778.5  0  630809.5 
  Differentiated  197  323076.9  1783088.0  0  2.21E+07 
Imports  Reference priced  197  78965.1  387245.2  0  4349311.0 
  Homogenous  197  42094.7  147648.1  0  1101462.0 
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3.2 Basic specification 
The  relationship  between  trade  and  immigration  may  be  driven  by  partner-specific 
unobservables such as cultural fondness. I therefore include partner-fixed effects in the model 
described above. The model to be estimated becomes: 
ln TRADEit = f(ln MIGRANTSit,  ln GDPit, ln GDPPCit, CORRUPTIONit, PTAit, αi, ωt), 
where αi  is a country-specific fixed effect and ωt is a time fixed effect. I include time fixed 
effects to take into account global trends in trade. I omit the interaction of immigration and 
corruption,  as  this  mechanism  operates  across  countries.  Indeed,  I  do  not  expect  yearly 
variations in corruption to impact the protrade effect of a specific migrant network. 
4. Empirical findings and robustness checks 
Results are in table 2. I find a positive and significant effect of migrants on total exports 
(column 1). It suggests a 10% increase in immigration results in a 3.4% increase in exports to 
the origin country. However, I do not find a significant impact on total imports (column 5).  
This  is  counterintuitive  since  it  should  capture  a  network  and  a  demand  effect.  Neither 
corruption, trade agreements nor GDP seem to explain the yearly variation in exports and 
imports, while GDP per capita has a strong and positive impact on both flows.  
To investigate further, I decompose trade flows according to the Rauch (1999) classification 
and run the same regressions. I find positive and significant migrant elasticities for exports of 
homogenous and differentiated goods (columns 3 and 4) and for imports of differentiated 
products (column 8) of 0.58, 0.31 and 0.29, respectively. The protrade effect does not appear 
stronger for exports of differentiated goods than for homogenous ones, as would be implied 
by higher search costs. Strangely, a deterioration of corruption seems to lead to more exports 
of homogenous and referenced goods (columns 2 and 3). To further explore these findings, I 





4.1 Migrant networks and the margins of trade 
Peri and Requena (2009) pointed out that migrants provide information that reduces the costs 
of setting up business in their country of origin, but not variable costs, such as transport costs 
and tariffs.  Within the Chaney (2008) distorted gravity model, a reduction in fixed entry 
costs causes an extension of trade but does not affect the amount exported by each firm
4. 
These entry costs can be defined  as search costs or as insurance costs that increase with 
corruption. If migrants’ diminish these insurance costs thanks to their knowledge of the rules-
of-the-game and trust, they should have an impact on the extensive margin.   
The preference effect, however, operates through an increase in demand, which, according to 
the Chaney (2008) model, does affect the amount sold by each exporting firm. Hence, an 
increase in migrants should increase both margins of imports. 
I  follow Peri  and Requena (2009) and decompose exports and  imports  into an extensive 
margin,  defined  as  the  number  of  HS  6-digit  product  lines  per  partner  per  year,  and  an 
intensive  margin,  defined  as  the  average  value  per  transaction.  I  then  estimate  the  same 
gravity model for the two margins of trade separately. For the extensive margin I use the 
Poisson and negative binomial models, as it is a count variable.  
Results in table 3 confirm the previous findings and prove more illuminating. All seems to 
take  place  at  the  extensive  margin.  I  find  positive,  significant  and  robust  effects  on  the 
extensive margin of exports of homogenous and differentiated goods and on the extensive 
margin of imports of differentiated goods. These confirm that, year-on-year, an increase in 
                                                 
4 This is because the optimal price and quantity produced by a firm does not depend on fixed trade costs in the 
model. However, a reduction in fixed costs reduces the productivity threshold for the exporting firm, hence 
affecting only the extensive margin. 
 
Within partner regressions 
 
Exports  Imports 
 
Total  Homogenous  Referenced  Differentiated  Total  Homogenous  Referenced  Differentiated 
ln (migrants)  0.338**  0.583***  0.121  0.313**  -0.063  -0.128  -0.091  0.285*   
 
(0.01)  (0.00)  (0.41)  (0.02)  (0.69)  (0.55)  (0.59)  (0.08) 
control of corruption  -0.05  -0.546**  -0.301*  0.008  0.09  -0.095  -0.298  -0.021 
 
(0.77)  (0.03)  (0.1)  (0.96)  (0.65)  (0.72)  (0.16)  (0.92) 
ln (GDP)  0.298  0.643*  0.24  0.244  -0.116  -0.862**  -0.229  -0.062 
 
(0.2)  (0.06)  (0.34)  (0.28)  (0.67)  (0.02)  (0.43)  (0.83) 
ln (GDP per capita)  1.898***  0.844  0.703  2.220***  2.346***  2.630***  1.039*  1.860*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.22)  (0.17)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
PTA  -0.216  -0.445  -0.015  -0.19  -0.027  0.179  -0.138  0.032 
 
(0.47)  (0.31)  (0.96)  (0.52)  (0.94)  (0.7)  (0.71)  (0.93) 
Constant  -15.4***  -20.84***  -4.98  -16.92***  -7.906  5.545  3.545  -8.347 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.31)  (0.00)  (0.14)  (0.44)  (0.54)  (0.14) 
Observations  1067  1067  1067  1067  1067  1067  1067  1067 
R2 (within)  0.148  0.098  0.032  0.167  0.089  0.034  0.05  0.112 
Note: All regressions include year dummies and partner fixed effects. Heteroscedastic-consistent p-values in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 10 
 
immigration  will  lead  to  the  creation  of  trade  in  new  products.  More  precisely,  a  10% 
increase of migrants increases the number of exported homogenous product lines by around 
2.3%  (column  1),  of  exported  differentiated  product  lines  by  1.2%  (column  3),  and  the 
number of imported differentiated product lines by at least 1.1% (column 6). Still, I find no 
ordering  of  coefficients  across  product  differentiation  categories.  This  suggests  the  entry 
costs  migrants  networks  lower  may  be  insurance  costs  rather  then  search  costs.  Further 




Several  econometric  issues  may  challenge  the  validity  of  the  results  above.  While  the 
findings indicate yearly increases in immigration are correlated with trade creation, they do 
not reveal the direction of causality. Maybe new trade partnerships beget migration flows. 
Previous research has solved this problem by using lagged migration as an instrument for 
current migration. Yet, it is not clear this instrument is strictly excludable, as the protrade 
effect could operate with a lag. Moreover, from 1995 to 2005, partner countries may have 
seen their trade and migration follow long run trends. As seen in figure 2, some countries, 
e.g. China, have seen upward trends in all variables. A positive and significant coefficient 
would not reveal much if this were the case in most countries. Also, as seen in the case of 
Croatia,  migrants  started  leaving  Switzerland  massively  around  2001  but  the  number  of 
export products didn’t fall, indicating persistence in trade relationships. This is simply to 
illustrate that the within country variation, at least over a ten-year period,  is not what one 
should look at to estimate the protrade effect of migrants. The levels of migration and trade 
across countries should provide more information. 
 
 
Table 3. Marginal effect of migrants on trade margins (within partners) 
   
Exports 




Homogenous  Referenced  Differentiated  Homogenous  Referenced  Differentiated 
 
Intensive margin 
FE OLS  0.485***  -0.005  0.109  -0.083  -0.049  -0.090 
 
(0.00)  (0.98)  (0.32)  (0.73)  (0.77)  (0.41)  
FE Poisson  -0.328  -0.148  -0.056  0.255  -0.345  -0.134 
 
(0.27)  (0.64)  (0.63)  (0.58)  (0.28)  (0.37) 
 
Extensive margin 
FE Poisson  0.311***  0.196***  0.200***  0.085  0.162  0.209*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.42)  (0.16)  (0.00) 
FE Negative  0.236***  0.036  0.117***  0.063  0.028  0.107*** 
binomial  (0.00)  (0.29)  (0.00)  (0.29)  (0.52)  (0.00)  
Note: All regressions include year dummies and partner fixed effects. Heteroscedastic-consistent p-values in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 11 
 
Also, given that I want to estimate the protrade effect of migrants across different levels of 
corruption,  a  fixed  effect  approach  is,  once  again,  not  appropriate.  Indeed,  corruption 
variation  within  a  country  is  often  meaningless  over  a  ten-year  period.  For  example, 
corruption in Germany has been increasing, while it has been fluctuating in Brazil (figure 2). 
The within country changes do not reflect that Brazil may have remained corrupt for Swiss 
exporters while Germany remained frictionless. 
Figure 2 
   
   
To identify  causality, I use an  instrumental  variable (IV) approach on an  averaged cross 
section. An averaged cross section provides many advantages. First, yearly data noises are 
cancelled.  Second,  I  am  able  to  estimate  a  protrade  effect  that  varies  across  countries 
according to the level of corruption.  





















To instrument for migrants in Switzerland, my first IV is the number of migrants in France, 
which I get from the Global Origin Migrant Database. The reason for which this provides a 
good  instrument  is  that  France  and  Switzerland  have  a  similar  distribution  of  migrants’ 
origins. However, migrants in France cannot help Swiss trade. To increase the variance in 
predicted migration in my first stage regression I also add Swiss visa restrictions as a second 
IV.  The  logic  here  is  that,  for  reasons  of  perceived  security  and  immigration-control, 
Switzerland might use visa restrictions to intentionally deter individuals from some countries 
to immigrate. These restrictions to immigration should not affect trade through channels other 
than migration. The visa restriction dummy is from Neumayer (2006). The interaction term is 
instrumented  by  the  interaction  of  the  IVs  described  above  with  the  corruption  variable. 
Results are in table 4.  
Table 4 
 
Among control variables, only GDP and distance seem to explain trade flows across product 
types.  As  for  migrants,  a  first  look  at the  table  suggests  coefficients  slightly  smaller  on 
IV-2SLS enhanced trade gravity estimates 
   
Exports 




Homogenous  Referenced  Differentiated  Homogenous  Referenced  Differentiated 
ln (migrants)  0.320**  0.314*  0.014  -0.020  0.085  0.469*** 
 
(0.03)  (0.07)  (0.84)  (0.94)  (0.60)  (0.00) 
control of corruption  1.103*  0.490  1.051***  -0.333  1.186**  0.821 
 
(0.09)  (0.42)  (0.00)  (0.73)  (0.04)  (0.17) 
ln (migrants) * 













ln (GDP)  0.911***  0.942***  1.052***  1.248***  1.095***  0.823*** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
ln (GDP per capita)  -0.016  -0.080  0.043  -0.366  0.157  0.403* 
 
(0.94)  (0.64)  (0.71)  (0.29)  (0.43)  (0.07) 
ln (distance)  -0.979***  -0.726***  -0.542***  -0.209  -0.576**  -0.204 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.58)  (0.02)  (0.35) 
border  -0.642  -0.057  0.795**  0.241  0.449  0.519 
 
(0.25)  (0.91)  (0.05)  (0.77)  (0.44)  (0.32) 
common language  0.576*  -0.570*  -0.221  0.142  0.121  -0.168 
 
(0.09)  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.73)  (0.70)  (0.62) 
island  1.061**  -0.059  0.089  0.799  -0.016  0.223 
 
(0.04)  (0.87)  (0.64)  (0.24)  (0.97)  (0.57) 
landlocked  -0.008  -0.583*  -0.174  0.212  -0.637*  0.081 
 
(0.98)  (0.06)  (0.25)  (0.68)  (0.07)  (0.80) 
PTA  0.742  0.358  -0.051  1.223  -0.126  -0.407 
 
(0.44)  (0.33)  (0.86)  (0.12)  (0.77)  (0.38) 
Remoteness  -0.849  4.431  -2.085  -6.048  -0.643  -6.730* 
 
(0.82)  (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.17)  (0.86)  (0.06) 
N  156  156  156  156  156  156 
Adj R2  0.794  0.875  0.939  0.597  0.845  0.846 
Hansen J p-val  0.24  0.07  0.30  0.04  0.09  0.89 
Cragg-Donald F  17.04  17.04  17.04  17.04  17.04  17.04 
Note: Heteroscedastic-consistent p-values in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. Only inference on non-interacted variables is of interest in this table. Excluded instruments are ln (migrants 13 
 
exports  and  bigger  on  imports  of  differentiated  products  than  what  the  within-partner 
regressions revealed. However, these effects vary with corruption, hence the need to push the 
analysis of the interaction further.  
4.3 The role of corruption and other trade inhibitors 
While Dunlevy (2006) limited his analysis of the interaction of migrants and corruption to the 
significance of the interaction term, I here further analyze it by plotting the marginal effects 
of migrants on trade at different levels of corruption as well as their confidence intervals in 
Figure 3
5. Indeed, conclusions based on the standard error of the interaction term alone do not 
tell the whole story (Greene, p. 124, and Brambor et al, 2008).  
For simplicity I only show the figures for selected flows. I superpose the density estimate of 
the corruption variable to indicate its distribution among trade partners. One can hence 
visualize for which proportion of countries the effect is significant.   The marginal effect of 
migrants on trade is increasing in corruption   for all types of goods   except imports of 
homogenous goods. This confirms the trust provision mechanism as migrants play a bigger 
role the worst the risk perception. Once again, these results do not indicate a stronger effect 
for differentiated products.  
For exports of differentiated goods, the effect is positive and significant only for countries 
with control of corruption below  -0.8, or worse than Russia’s. For imports of differentiated 
goods, the effect can be as high as 0.75 and is positive and significant for most countries, 
unless they are as clean as Japan. For exports of homogenous goods (not graphed), the effect 
is positive and significant for countries where corruption is worse than in Morocco, where it 







                                                 
5 The standard error of interest is 
 𝜎   =  ?𝑎? 𝗽  
?𝑖𝑔?𝑎???   + 𝑐??????𝑖??2?𝑎? 𝗽  
𝑖??𝑒?𝑎𝑐?𝑖??   + 2(𝑐??????𝑖??)𝑐??(𝗽  
?𝑖𝑔?𝑎??? 𝗽  
𝑖??𝑒?𝑎𝑐?𝑖?? ).  14 
 
Figure 3 
The marginal effect of migrants on trade at different levels of corruption 
   
   
 
   
The substitution effect between migrants and institutions is robust to the use of an alternate 
measure, i.e. the rule of law from the World Governance Indicators (Figure 3), and also to 
measures of border corruption, i.e. the number of documents (or days) required to import
6. As 
seen in Figure  4,  the effect of migrants on exports is bigger when many documents are 
required, highlighting the role of knowledge of the rules-of-the-game. For homogenous goods 
exports, migrants play a significant role only when  7 or more documents are needed (as in 
Argentina or Malaysia). I also find (graphs not shown) that for differentiated goods exports, 
12 documents need to be required for migrants to play a significant role  (as in Angola and 
Malawi).  For imports of differentiated goods, migrants play a significant role only when 6 or 
more export documents are needed (as in Armenia or Bangladesh) or when it takes at least 22 
days to export (as in Belize and Belarus) while for the import of homogenous goods migrants 
do not play a significant role.  
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Figure 4 
The marginal effect of migrants on exports for different import document requirements 
   
   
 
I also verify if my results hold when applying a 3SLS (which combine the IV regressions 
with a SUR system) and a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood model
7 which is more precise 
and consistent in the case of log-linearized models with heteroskedasticity (Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006). The IV Poisson and 3SLS regressions confirm previous results, while the 
Poisson does not perform as well. Table 5 compares the marginal effects of migrants on the 
different trade flows estimated using the methods discussed above. The joint significance of 
migrant networks and their interactions with corruption is also given. Across all methods the 
robustness of the joint significance stands out, except for import of homogenous goods. This 
confirms a clear, causal protrade effect that substitutes for formal institutions across all types 
of flows, except imports of homogenous goods.  
Table 5 
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Table 3. Marginal effects of migrants on trade flows 





Homogenous  Referenced   Differentiated  Homogenous  Referenced   Differentiated 
OLS   0.158  0.326  0.022  -0.007  0.284  0.323 
 
(3.430)**  (8.250)***  (7.630)***  (0.010)  (5.500)***  (6.850)*** 
IV-2SLS  0.437  0.392  0.023  0.096  0.162  0.550 
 
(6.330)**  (6.400)**  (12.64)***  (0.15)  (5.830)*  (16.26)*** 
Poisson  0.007  0.167  0.055  -0.027  -0.009  0.133  
 
(1.130)  (10.02)***  (1.490)  (0.100)  (1.950)  (2.300) 
IV-Poisson  0.452  0.461  0.009  -0.197  0.163  0.529 
 
(5.790)*  (4.530)*  (16.68)***  (2.590)  (18.74)***  (24.51)*** 
3SLS  0.420  0.753  0.114  0.013  0.673  0.765 
 
(10.32)***  (33.05)***  (12.82)***  (0.040)  (18.09)***  (24.16)*** 
Marginal effects are estimated at the mean of control of corruption. The joint significance of ln(migrants) and its 
interaction with control of corruption is given by the F statistics in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 16 
 
For another robustness check I also run the regressions including Swiss migrants in partner 
countries using data from the Global Migrant Origin Database. Oddly, I find no significant 
effect of Swiss migrants but no change to previous results. Also, I estimate the model using 
passport  costs  as  a  predictor  of  emigration  in  the  first  stage,  as  Javorcik  et  al.  (2006). 
McKenzie (2007) showed that high passport costs are associated with lower levels of outward 
migration and tend to be correlated with other emigration  barriers  imposed  by countries. 
Using this IV reduces the sample to 113 observations but confirms the results (not shown). 
Also,  as  Rauch  (1996)  had  suggested  migrant  networks  facilitate  trade  through  contract 
enforcement, they should be most useful the worse the contract enforcement measure from 
Doing  Business,  even though this  measure captures  local  and  not international  contracts. 
However, I do not find such results. Contract enforcement in partner countries does not even 
explain trade with Switzerland. 
4.4 Causality at the extensive margin 
As within partner  the protrade effect was  acting entirely on the extensive  margin,  I  now 
replicate the cross section regressions on the margins of trade. Here, the extensive margin is 
defined as the number of HS 6-digit product lines per partner, and the intensive margin as the 
average value per transaction. Again, my results confirm those of Peri and Requena (2009), 
as  the  impact  of  migrants  is  positive  and  significant  only  on  the  extensive  margin.  The 
Poisson, IV Poisson and negative binomial, confirm this result and provide further evidence 
that a larger community of migrants reduces the fixed costs of exporting to their countries of 
origin (table 7). Figure 5 shows the marginal effect of migrants on the extensive margin of 
exports.  I  find  a  somewhat  bigger  effect  on  exports  of  differentiated  goods  than  on 
homogenous ones, though not significant.  
Peri and Requena (2009) suggested that the fixed costs of trade with countries with severe 
problems  of  inefficiency  of  institutions  could  be  so  high  that  the  presence  of  migrant 
networks could decrease fixed trade costs no matter how differentiated the goods. On the 
other  hand,  developed  countries  fixed  costs  are  not  large  and  the  presence  of  a  migrant 
network should predominantly affect the transmission of complex information that is likely to 
be more relevant for differentiated goods. Hence, I also ran these regressions on a sample 
restricted to low corruption countries (with control of corruption above average). I still found 
no evidence of a significantly stronger effect on differentiated products, whether for imports 
or exports. This finding, combined with the institution-substitution effect, strongly suggests 
migrant networks cause an extension of exports through a reduction of  fixed  entry costs 17 
 
characterised  by  risk  and  corruption,  rather  than  through  a  reduction  of  search  costs, 
characterised by product differentiation. 
Table 6 
 
  Figure 5   
The marginal effect of migrants on the extensive margin of exports 
   
For imports, according to Chaney (2008), an increase in migrants should increase both the 
intensive and extensive margins, with the effect on the intensive margin being only a demand 
effect. Surprisingly, I find no effect of migrants on the intensive margin of imports. This 
either rejects the demand effect or suggests that it  also operates on the extensive margin. 
Indeed, as shown in Figure 6, the effect on the extensive margin of imports is significant and 
depends on corruption.  
 
Table XX. Marginal effect of migrants on trade margins 
  Exports  Imports 
  Homogenous  Referenced  Differentiated  Homogenous  Referenced  Differentiated 
  Intensive margin 
Poisson  -0.202  0.045  -0.035  -0.267  -0.068  -0.005 
  (3.81)  (4.35)  (2.73)  (8.30)**  (2.50)  (0.01) 
IV-Poisson  0.185  0.177  -0.040  0.086  -0.214  0.075 
  (2.86)  (7.95)**  (1.52)  (17.4)***  (8.77)**  (1.91) 
OLS  -0.030  0.111  -0.058  -0.229  -0.000  0.074 
  (0.06)  (2.18)  (1.63)  (2.15)  (1.51)  (0.89) 
IV-2SLS  0.221  0.104  -0.018  -0.245  -0.174  0.246 
  (0.89)  (2.40)*  (0.25)  (0.72)  (1.77)  (2.72)* 
  Extensive margin 
Poisson  0.118  0.149  0.130  0.228  0.219  0.131 
  (20.2)***  (35.1)***  (95.5)***  (23.7)***  (34.2)***  (94.7)*** 
IV-Poisson  0.148  0.138  0.149  0.257  0.266  0.159 
  (5.51)*  (11.1)***  (46.2)***  (14.1)***  (6.54)**  (43.7)*** 
Negative   0.126  0.192  0.131  0.261  0.293  0.134 
binomial  (21.5)***  (57.3)***  (101.3)***  (36.3)***  (50.3)***  (87.7)*** 
Marginal effects are estimated at the mean of control of corruption. The joint significance of ln(migrants) and its 
interaction with control of corruption is given by the F statistics in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Controls are as listed in table XX. 
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Figure 6 
The marginal effect of migrants on the margins of imports 
   
5. Conclusion 
This paper presents evidence, from a never-before exploited migration data set, of a causal 
effect of migrants on both exports and imports. The migrant networks’ effect is found to be a 
strong substitute for formal institutions. Not only do I confirm Dunlevy’s (2005) result using 
Swiss instead of US data, I also show that the substitution effect is causal and robust to the 
use of various institutional measures and across organized exchange, reference priced and 
differentiated  goods.  However,  I  find  no ordering  of  magnitudes  across  these  categories, 
breaking with the previous literature. Nonetheless, I show that the protrade effect of migrant 
networks  takes  place  entirely  on  the  extensive  margin,  indicating  a  fixed  cost  reduction 
mechanism. Taken together, these results suggest that migrant networks, rather than reducing 
search costs, could be reducing fixed-entry costs characterised by corruption thanks to their 
knowledge of the rules-of-the-game. 
After waves of globalization, international exchange still faces various obstacles and shaky 
institutions remain an ongoing concern. This paper provides further evidence that migrant 
networks  can  substitute  for  formal  institutions  and  bring  about  new  trade  relationships. 
Considering the productivity and welfare gains associated with trade, this clearly highlights a 
major benefit from immigration.  
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